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8 November 1995
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 44
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 8 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government and further to our earlier letters concerning repeated Israeli attacks on southern Lebanon and the western Bekaa, I have the honour to notify you of a series of such attacks that took place in the second half of October 1995.

17 October 1995

An Israeli force infiltrated the environs of Nabatiyah al-Fawqa and blew up a house belonging to a Lebanese.

18 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar and Jba', as well as the Mlita hills and Jabal Safi. Israeli military aircraft overflew the western Bekaa, Tyre and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas.

19 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Majdal Silm, Khirbat Silm and Tulin. Israeli military aircraft overflew Mashgharah, Maydun and Ayn al-Tinah.

21 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Haddatha, Ayta al-Jabal, Tibnin, Bra'shit, Yatar and Kafr Rumman. Israeli forces carried out a heavy and intense bombardment of Jba' as a result of which some 30 per cent of its inhabitants took flight.

22 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled Yuhmur, Arnun, Arabsalim, Kafr Rumman, the area around the Habbush bridge, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, Mazra'at al-Hamra, Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, areas along the Litani river and Kafr Tibnit. One house was destroyed, and one Lebanese was injured.

23 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar. Israeli military aircraft overflew the area of Sidon and the camps nearby, as well as the Nabatiyah area.

24 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju', Ayn Bu Siwar, the Mlita hills, Jabal Safi, Nabatiyah al-Fawqa, Zawtar al-Sharqiyah, Zawtar al-Gharbiyah, Kafr Rumman, Kafr Tibnit, Mazra'at al-Hamra, Habbush, Ayn al-Tinah and Maydun, as well as several neighbourhoods in Nabatiyah and the Marj Uyun highway. Israeli military aircraft overflew the Nabatiyah, Tyre and Iqlim al-Tuffah areas.

25 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar, as well as the Mlita hills and Jabal Safi. Israeli military aircraft overflew the area of Sidon and the camps nearby, as well as the Tyre, Damur and Nabatiyah areas.

26 October 1995

Israeli military aircraft overflew the town of Sidon and the camps nearby, as well as the Damur area.

28 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the environs of Arabsalim, Jarju' and Ayn Bu Siwar, as well as the Mlita hills and Jabal Safi.

29 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled the hills to the south of Ayn al-Tinah and Maydun.

30 October 1995

Israeli forces shelled Kafra, Yatar and Haris and attempted to advance towards these towns.

31 October 1995

Israeli military aircraft made frequent overflights of the Iqlim al-Tuffah and Nabatiyah areas carrying out mock attacks.

The Lebanese Government strongly condemns these repeated Israeli attacks, which have caused enormous damage to property. It further condemns in the strongest terms the arbitrary practices against civilians. Like previous attacks, this new series constitutes blatant aggression against the sovereignty and independence of Lebanon and represents another flagrant violation of international law and basic human rights.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 44, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir MOUBARAK
Permanent Representative

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S/1995/940
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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH, FRENCH
RUSSIAN AND SPANISH

Argentina, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its earlier resolutions on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and reaffirming its resolutions 1004 (1995) of 12 July 1995, and 1010 (1995) of 10 August 1995, and the statements of its President of 7 September 1995 (S/PRST/1995/43) and 12 October 1995 (S/PRST/1995/52), and deeply concerned that despite repeated calls that it should do so, the Bosnian Serb party has not complied with the demands contained therein,

Gravely concerned at reports, including by the representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of grave violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in and around Srebrenica, and in the areas of Banja Luka and Sanski Most, including reports of mass murder, unlawful detention and forced labour, rape, and deportation of civilians,

Recalling also all its earlier relevant resolutions on the situation in the Republic of Croatia, and reaffirming its resolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995, and the statements of its President of 7 September 1995 (S/PRST/1995/44), and of 3 October 1995 (S/PRST/1995/49),

Deeply concerned at reports, including by UNCRO and United Nations humanitarian agencies, of serious violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the former sectors West, North, and South, in the Republic of Croatia, including burning of houses, looting of property, and killings of civilians,

Reiterating its strong support for the efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in seeking access to displaced persons and to persons detained or reported missing and condemning in the strongest possible terms the failure of the Bosnian Serb party to comply with their commitments in respect of such access,

Commending the efforts of the United Nations peace forces and other United Nations personnel in the former Yugoslavia, in particular in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite extreme difficulties,

Taking note of the letter to the President of the Security Council from the President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia of 31 October 1995 (S/1995/910),

Expressing its strong support for the work of the International Tribunal established pursuant to its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993,

1. Condemns in the strongest possible terms all violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and demands that all concerned comply fully with their obligations in this regard;

2. Reaffirms its demand that the Bosnian Serb party give immediate and unimpeded access to representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the ICRC and other international agencies to persons displaced and to persons detained or reported missing from Srebrenica, Zepa, and the regions of Banja Luka and Sanski Most who are within the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces and that the Bosnian Serb party permit representatives of the ICRC (i) to visit and register any persons detained against their will, whether civilians or members of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and (ii) to have access to any site it may deem important;

3. Reaffirms also its demand that the Bosnian Serb party respect fully the rights of all such persons, ensure their safety, and release them immediately;

4. Reaffirms further the obligation on all the parties to ensure the complete freedom of movement of personnel of the United Nations and other relevant international organizations throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina at all times;

5. Demands that all detention camps throughout the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be immediately closed;

6. Reaffirms its demand that the Government of the Republic of Croatia take urgent measures to put an end to violations of international humanitarian law and of human rights, and investigate all reports of such violations so that those responsible in respect of such acts be judged and punished;

7. Reiterates its demand that the Government of the Republic of Croatia respect fully the rights of the local Serb population including their right to remain or return in safety and reiterates also its call upon the Government of the Republic of Croatia to lift any time-limits placed on the return of refugees to Croatia to reclaim their property;

8. Demands that all States, in particular those in the region of the former Yugoslavia, and all parties to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia,

comply fully and in good faith with the obligations contained in paragraph 4 of resolution 827 (1993) to cooperate fully with the International Tribunal established pursuant to that resolution including by providing access to individuals and sites the Tribunal deems important for its investigations, and by complying with requests for assistance or orders issued by a trial chamber under article 29 of the Statute of the Tribunal, and calls upon them to allow the establishment of offices of the Tribunal;

9. Demands that all parties, and in particular the Bosnian Serb party, refrain from any action intended to destroy, alter, conceal, or damage any evidence of violations of international humanitarian law and that they preserve such evidence;

10. Reaffirms its support for the actions of the United Nations peace forces, and other United Nations personnel, including the great importance of their contribution in the humanitarian field, and demands that all parties fully ensure their safety and cooperate fully with them;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council as soon as possible a written report based on all information available to the United Nations concerning recent violations of international humanitarian law in the areas of Srebrenica, Zepa, Banja Luka and Sanski Most;

12. Requests also the Secretary-General to continue to inform the Council on a regular basis of measures taken by the Government of the Republic of Croatia to implement resolution 1009 (1995) and the present resolution;

13. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

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S/1995/941
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LETTER DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you that, during the period from 21 to 31 October 1995, United States aircraft continued to violate Iraqi national airspace for the purpose of surveillance and provocation.

21 October 1995

1. Southern region: 73 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Chabaish, Qurnah and Busayyah.

2. On 21 October 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0920 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1125 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1205 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1405 hours.

22 October 1995

1. Southern region: 72 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qurnah, Chabaish, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

2. On 22 October 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1000 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1200 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1300 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1455 hours.

23 October 1995

1. Northern region: 16 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Mosul, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 32 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Jalibah, Artawi, Busayyah and Shanafiyah.

24 October 1995

1. Northern region: 12 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Zakho, Mosul, Aqrah, Dohuk, Ayn Zalah and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 56 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Artawi, Busayyah, Jalibah and Chabaish.

3. At 0930 hours on 24 October 1995, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier over the Basra area.

25 October 1995

1. Northern region: 14 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: [illegible] sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Chabaish, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

3. On 25 October 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0928 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1052 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1000 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1220 hours.

4. At 0722 hours on 25 October 1995, a hostile formation broke the sound barrier over the Chabaish area.

26 October 1995

1. Northern region: 21 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 42 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Artawi and Busayyah.

3. On 26 October 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 0910 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1100 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1200 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1353 hours.

27 October 1995

1. Northern region: 11 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Mosul, Dohuk, Irbil, Aqrah, Rawandoz and Amadiyah.

2. Southern region: 53 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Chabaish, Qurnah, Jalibah and Busayyah.

28 October 1995

1. Northern region: 7 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Zakho, Irbil, Mosul, Dohuk, Amadiyah and Aqrah.

2. Southern region: 62 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Chabaish, Artawi, Shu'aybah, Busayyah, Qurnah and Salman.

3. At 1410 hours on 28 October 1995, a United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1443 hours.

29 October 1995

1. Southern region: 36 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Artawi, Jalibah and Busayyah.

2. On 29 October 1995, two United States TR-1 reconnaissance aircraft flying at a speed of 600 kilometres per hour and at an altitude of 20,000 metres violated Iraqi airspace over the southern region, as follows:

The first flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1005 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1130 hours.

The second flight entered Iraqi airspace at 1310 hours and left in the direction of Kuwait at 1345 hours.

30 October 1995

1. Southern region: 38 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Nasiriyah, Samawah, Qal'at Salih, Qurnah, Jalibah, Artawi and Busayyah.

31 October 1995

1. Southern region: 44 sorties, flown at speeds of 600 to 900 kilometres per hour and at medium altitudes over Qurnah, Nasiriyah, Samawah, Salman, Busayyah, Jalibah and Artawi.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Security Council

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S/1995/942
9 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 7 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a letter dated 6 November 1995 addressed to you by Mr. Mohammed Said Al-Sahaf, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Iraq, concerning the violations committed by the U-2 aircraft.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex

Letter dated 6 November 1995 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the President of the Security Council

In August 1991 the Special Commission informed Iraq that it had decided to conduct aerial reconnaissances of Iraq using a United States U-2 spy plane. Despite Iraq's opposition to this decision and the many protests it has lodged in the 102 letters on the subject it has thus far addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organization, the United Nations and the Special Commission have paid no heed to Iraq's legitimate objections and the aircraft has continued to be dispatched on its dubious missions. As of the end of October 1995 it had made 274 overflights, for a total flight time of 1,148 hours.

A glance at the paths followed by the aircraft during its overflights indicates that the targets chosen for it are dictated by the intelligence requirements of United States policy. An example that demonstrates the veracity of this assertion is the incident of 4 October 1991, when the aircraft's penetration coincided with the violation of Iraq's airspace by Israeli aircraft in such a way as to confirm that there were hostile objectives underlying the apparent coincidence. Similarly, the overflight by the aircraft on 5 April 1992 came a few hours after an Iranian air raid on Iraqi territory and its overflight for that day centred on the Iraq-Iran border area. The aircraft's violation of 1 January 1993 brought with it new proof of its intelligence-gathering function, since the overflight was confined to the southern part of Iraq where the United States was bringing into effect an unlawful aerial exclusion zone that Iraq does not recognize. The aircraft's mission on this overflight of southern Iraq was nothing less than to carry out surveillance and reconnaissance in full coordination with United States Navy warplanes flying combat patrols in the same area in violation of Iraq's sovereignty and Iraq's airspace. This was a breach of international law for purposes that bore no relation to the mandate of the Special Commission as set forth in Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

In his letter dated 19 August 1991 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq requested that the photographs taken and the information gathered by the aircraft should remain in United Nations custody to be used exclusively for the purposes of the Special Commission as set forth in Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and that the United Nations should provide assurances that the photographs and information would not in any way be leaked for purposes other than those indicated by the Organization. The practical reality has been quite otherwise, and it has become clear that the country that owns the aircraft is using the information gathered by it for its own particular purposes, which are inconsistent with the mandate of the Special Commission. The best indication of that was the report published by The New York Times on 15 August 1995, in which it was said that military officials had disclosed movements by United States ships, possible military exercises in Kuwait in the near future in which some 5,000 American troops would take part, and increased overflights of Iraq by the American U-2 spy plane.

Even more astonishing is the statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, as published in The New York Times on 16 October 1993, when he said, in reply to a question from the newspaper on the possible use of a United States U-2 spy plane for United Nations operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "I don't want a James Bond spy plane at the United Nations".

It is thus a James Bond spy plane and is of ill repute when it is a matter of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but when it is to be used against Iraq it is an aircraft gathering information for the United Nations.

The facts revealed since overflights by this aircraft began in 1991 require the immediate re-examination by the United Nations of the forcible use of the aircraft by the United States of America to violate Iraq's airspace in a manner totally incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as they relate to respect for the sovereignty of all Member States.

We take this opportunity to reiterate the request we have constantly made that Iraqi aircraft be used instead of foreign aircraft in the work of the Special Commission in order to exclude any possibility of such foreign aircraft being used for purposes prejudicial to Iraq's sovereignty and security.

(Signed) Mohammed Said AL-SAHAF
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Republic of Iraq

UNITED
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Security Council

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10 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACE-KEEPING

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the Security Council's request that I report, at least once a year, on the progress made on standby arrangements with Member States concerning their possible contribution to United Nations peace-keeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22). It covers developments since the submission of my previous report on the subject on 30 June 1994 (S/1994/777).

II. CONCEPT

2. The purpose of a standby arrangement is to have a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available at a given state of readiness, should it agree to contribute to a peace-keeping operation. Such an understanding facilitates the Organization's efforts to identify troops and equipment for new and ongoing operations, as well as to plan and budget for their deployment. Similarly, it places the participating Government in a better position to plan and budget for a possible contribution to a peace-keeping operation, to train and prepare its personnel and, if necessary, to arrange for equipment. Standby arrangements apply to peace-keeping operations only; enforcement operations fall outside their scope.

3. Standby arrangements are based on the established principle that contributions to peace-keeping operations are voluntary. It follows that a standby arrangement does not constitute an automatic obligation on the part of the participating Member State to contribute. Hence, it cannot be assumed that all resources will indeed be made available when so requested. The key element in the system of standby arrangements is the exchange of detailed information to facilitate planning and preparation for both the participating Member States and the United Nations. Information provided to the Secretariat is stored in a database and kept confidential.

4. Under a standby arrangement, a Member State identifies certain resources for possible use in United Nations peace-keeping operations. Such resources may include military units, individual civilian and military personnel (e.g. police,

military observers), specialized services, equipment and other capabilities. The Member State provides the United Nations on an annual basis with information on those resources, their state of readiness and equipment, as well as an indication of the time needed to prepare them for deployment. These details should be confirmed in writing.

5. The resources are to remain in their home country until employment, the timing of which is usually decided upon in discussions between the Secretariat and the Member State in question. The usual period of deployment is six months for military units and one year for individuals. A military unit may, after the agreed period, be replaced by another unit and return to its standby status in the home country.

6. The responsibility for the training of standby personnel rests with Member States. To assist Governments in this area, the Secretariat has developed training manuals, covering general aspects of peace-keeping, and has set up United Nations training assistance teams, made up of experienced peace-keepers provided by Member States.

7. To facilitate the process of planning and preparation, the Secretariat has defined standard components or "building blocks" from which various types of operations may be constructed. These "building blocks" are broken down into small basic elements, thus facilitating broad participation by Member States at levels commensurate with their capabilities. Standard components include headquarters support units, infantry battalions, civilian police, communications units, air services, engineer support, health services, multi-role logistic units, transportation, maintenance, supply, movement control and food and catering services. While most units would usually be staffed by military personnel, this is not a requirement.

8. These standard components are listed in tables of organization and equipment that have been made available to Member States. The tables provide guidelines on tasks, organization, size and equipment, including the number of vehicles, of the types of units typically deployed in peace-keeping operations. The tables, issued first in 1994, also served as a basis for the revision of the system of reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment, which has been the subject of extensive consultations between the Secretariat and troop contributors. The results of these consultations will in due course be reflected in subsequent versions of the tables.

III. CURRENT STATUS

9. Since the start of the standby-arrangement initiative in 1993, members of the Secretariat's standby-arrangements team have visited 57 countries. In addition, the Secretariat is in touch with the Governments of 80 others. Discussions held thus far were considered useful and have contributed to a better mutual understanding of the process of contributing troops and equipment to United Nations peace-keeping operations.

10. Significant progress has been achieved over the last year. In my previous report, I reported that 21 Member States had confirmed their willingness to

provide standby resources totalling some 30,000 personnel that could, in principle, be called upon. As of 31 October 1995, 47 Member States have made such a confirmation, involving a total of 55,000 personnel: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Chad, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Guatemala, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Senegal, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Of these 47 Member States, some 30 have provided information on specific capabilities. Two Member States, Jordan and Denmark, have formalized their standby arrangements through a memorandum of understanding.

11. The resources involved are shown in the annex to the present document. The 55,000 include elements of different sizes, varying from infantry battalions to individual military observers, and cover the whole range of components listed in the tables of organization and equipment. The bulk of resources consists of infantry; there is a need for additional resources to complement that number of infantry with the necessary logistic support, especially in the areas of communications, multi-role logistics, transport, health services, engineering, mine-clearing and transport utility aircraft. Moreover, most of the resources with a full complement of equipment and logistic support are from the group of Western European and Other States. The Secretariat will, therefore, continue its discussions to seek the broadest possible participation by Member States as well as to arrive at a proper mix of troops and supporting units.

IV. INFORMATION AND PLANNING

12. The Secretariat is currently aiming to improve and expand its database with detailed information to be provided by participating Governments. Such information would enable the Secretariat to determine, in advance, detailed requirements of peace-keeping forces and of individual units, in planning sea/airlift provisions, and addressing any deficiencies in the composition and equipment of peace-keeping units. Obviously, this would further speed up the process of planning and deployment. For example, the information provided by Governments proved helpful in the planning for the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and the United Nations Mission in Haiti.

13. The detailed information required for these purposes includes the response time for each individual unit, any political or material preconditions, period of self-sufficiency, level of equipment, probable port of departure, total surface/volume/weight, number of vehicles, number of containers, information on particularly large or heavy items, information on dangerous cargo (e.g. ammunition) and any specific handling instructions. To date, 15 Governments have provided the Secretariat with these data.

14. Such information may also help in addressing the problem of units that lack the proper equipment. In principle, units should be fully equipped based on the guidelines provided in the tables of organization and equipment. This may, however, not be achievable for all contributing countries. It is, therefore,

important to provide information on the level and status of equipment at the time a standby arrangement is agreed upon. This would enable the Secretariat to identify any gaps and to seek solutions to fill them in advance. In this connection, I should like to repeat the suggestion made earlier (S/26450, para. 17, and S/1995/1, para. 45) that partnerships be established between Governments that need equipment and those ready to provide it. Standby arrangements provide a vehicle for such partnerships. In this regard, I should also mention that the Secretariat is in touch with African Governments and the Organization of African Unity in line with ongoing efforts by Member States to improve the preparedness for conflict-prevention and peace-keeping on that continent.

15. Detailed information is equally useful in the area of logistic support. In principle, troops should arrive in the mission area with sufficient provisions to sustain themselves for a period of 60 days, during which period the United Nations would set up the necessary logistic support capacity. In reality, however, this takes much longer, sometimes as long as four months. This gap could usefully be bridged by military-based logistic support. In the case of UNAVEM III, for example, a logistic support unit contributed by the United Kingdom provided useful third-line support for a period of three months at the start of that Mission, enabling it in that period to find civilian contractors to replace it. Detailed information on the capabilities of such units would be helpful in preparing for the early stages of an operation.

V. RESPONSE TIME

16. In several instances, I have drawn attention to the problem of the often long period between a Security Council decision to establish an operation and the arrival of troops and equipment in the mission area. In this regard the Security Council expressed the belief (S/PRST/1995/9) that the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing standby arrangements. A key element in this regard is response time, defined as the period between the time the request to provide resources is made and the time these resources are ready for air/sealift to the mission area. Response time includes the time required by Governments for domestic political approval, administrative procedures and military preparation.

17. Initially, Governments were given preferred response times: 7 days for individuals, 14 days for elements involved in the reception phase and 30 days for other units. However, the responses from Governments to date indicate that few are able to adhere to these preferences. For example, it was found that there were considerable differences in the response time for various categories of personnel, e.g. standing professional armies, call-up mechanisms (reservists) and/or conscript forces, the last of which require a longer period of preparation.

18. The Secretariat has thus begun to register response times according to the declared individual capacities of Member States. The response times given for confirmed standby resources vary from 7 days to over 90 days, with many Governments needing over 60 days to prepare for deployment. This information would, in principle, enable the Secretariat to call on all potential troop

contributors, since units with longer response times may be planned for employment in the later stages of a peace-keeping operation.

19. Another important factor in rapid deployment is the time needed to deploy resources in the field once they are ready. This depends on the timely availability of aircraft or ships as well as on political factors. Deployment time could be shortened dramatically if sea/airlift resources were to be made available by Member States having that capacity.

VI. FINAL REMARKS

20. The system of standby arrangements has proven most useful in its ability to expedite planning. The information provided has facilitated the process of identifying possible troop contributors and planning for deployment of troops and equipment. Another improvement has been the development of standards, contained in the tables of organization and equipment, which have helped to achieve a measure of standardization.

21. While there is certainly no lack of willingness to make troops and equipment available for peace-keeping operations, the United Nations is currently far from having a rapid reaction capability. In this regard, I welcome recent initiatives taken by Member States to address this issue, either individually or in partnership with other Member States. The Secretariat, for its part, will continue its dialogue with Governments with a view to broadening the geographical base of available resources and obtaining the information necessary to facilitate and accelerate the organization, planning and deployment of peace-keeping operations.

Annex

UN STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS

A. Military Forces



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B. Others


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1994
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Civilian Police
Observers
Civilian Specialists
Staff Officers

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/944
10 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit the attached report, which was addressed to me on 8 November 1995 by the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, concerning the operations of the International Conference's Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). This report by the Co-Chairmen contains the certification referred to in Security Council resolution 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

95-34945 (E) 101195 111195

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Annex

Operations of the Mission of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 988 (1995) of 21 April 1995 and paragraph 2 of Council resolution 1015 (1995) of 15 September 1995. In those resolutions, the Council requested that the Secretary-General submit every 30 days for its review a report from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

2. It will be recalled that, on 4 August 1994, the following measures were ordered by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to come into effect the same day:

(a) "To break off political and economic relations with the 'Republika Srpska'";

(b) "To prohibit the stay of the members of the leadership of the 'Republika Srpska' (Parliament, Presidency and Government) in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia";

(c) "As of today the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is closed for all transport towards the 'Republika Srpska' except food, clothing and medicine".

3. On 19 September, 3 October, 2 November and 5 December 1994 and 5 January, 3 February, 2 March, 31 March, 13 April, 18 May, 25 June, 3 August, 6 September and 11 October 1995, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council reports from the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the above-mentioned measures (S/1994/1074; S/1994/1124; S/1994/1246; S/1994/1372; S/1995/6; S/1995/104; S/1995/175; S/1995/255; S/1995/302; S/1995/406; S/1995/510; S/1995/645; S/1995/768 and S/1995/865). The report dated 11 October 1995 contained the following certification from the Co-Chairmen:

> "In the light of the foregoing developments, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, either from the airborne reconnaissance system of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that, during the period

covered by the present report, there have been no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

Developments since the last report are outlined below.

II. LEGISLATION/REGULATIONS ON THE BORDER CLOSURE

4. The decision of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to break off all economic and political relations with the "Republika Srpska" that was reached at the one hundred eighty-seventh session on 4 August 1994 and amended during the two hundred seventy-fifth session on 13 July 1995, was further amended at the three hundred third session on 17 October 1995. The latest amendment to the said decision stipulated that, in addition to food, clothing and medicine; articles for hygiene and disinfectants; books, textbooks and other school materials; funeral equipment; and articles for religious services, the following goods may be sent to the "Republika Srpska" as humanitarian aid:

Building materials

Plastic sheeting

Coal and wood burning stoves

Fifty tons of fuel oil (one off).

5. The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) have provided the Mission with the following list of confiscations conducted along its border with Bosnia and Herzegovina for the month of September 1995:

Petrol	9.5 tons
Diesel	9.7 tons
Motor oil	1.1 tons
Cigarettes	380 kg
Construction materials	8.1 tons
Wood	96 cubic metres
Alcohol	1.6 tons
Food	2.8 tons
Textiles, clothing, footwear	0.9 tons
Motor vehicles	8
Animals	56
Electrical gadgets	42 kg
Other goods	8.7 tons

6. There were 147 new offence procedures initiated during the month of September and 92 were finalized. Fines and penalties amounted to 185,600 dinars. In volume terms, the confiscations were down from the previous month but the number of new offence cases and value of penalties continue to be well above the average for the previous 13 reporting periods. Confiscations in the

Sector Alpha area along the Drina River continue to account for 80 per cent of the total confiscations along the border.

III. ORGANIZATION, FINANCING AND WORK OF THE MISSION

7. As of 6 November 1995, there were 217 international observers on duty in the Mission. The Mission personnel to date have come from the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. At this time, Canada, Greece, Portugal and Spain are not represented in the Mission.

8. During the reporting period, approximately 4,500 refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina crossed the border into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) mainly through the border crossing point at Sremska Raca. The operational situation within the Mission's area of responsibility has remained calm.

9. During the period 12 to 18 October, the Mission conducted a traffic survey at all 17 border crossing points. A similar exercise was conducted last March to determine the actual numbers of vehicles and persons crossing the border daily in both directions. This most recent survey indicates an overall 30 per cent reduction of traffic over the past seven months. Actual average daily figures are as follows:

Persons	20,444 (-29 per cent)
Buses	252 (-28 per cent)
Lorries/Trucks	143 (-28.5 per cent)
Cars	5,275 (-28 per cent)
Tractors	443 (-41 per cent)

The three busiest crossing points, accounting for more than half the traffic volume, were again Sremska Raca (Sector Belgrade), Badovinci (Sector Alpha) and Trbusnica (Sector Alpha). The downward trend was reflected at all border crossing points apart from Ljubovija (Sector Alpha), where there was a noticeable increase of all vehicular traffic. A possible explanation for this increase is that after the July fall of the Srebrenica enclave, located some 10 kilometres to the south-west of Ljuboviha, Bosnian Serbs who relocated to the Srebrenica area started to use the Ljubovija border crossing point. Though not related to this traffic survey, the frequency of freight trains passing briefly through the areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces diminished by 33 per cent.

IV. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND SECURITY OF PERSONNEL

10. With a few exceptions, the Mission continues to enjoy freedom of movement within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). On 19 and 27 October, the movements of two Mission mobile patrols were restricted in the vicinity of Uvac (Sector Bravo) when they were denied entry through a Yugoslav

Army (VJ) checkpoint. On 20 October, the Mission Coordinator and his Chief of Staff were obliged to wait 20 minutes at the same checkpoint before getting permission to pass through it. On 28 October, the Chief of Staff of the Mission called on the Deputy Head of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) Department for Relations with Foreign Attachés and International Organizations and drew his attention to the above-mentioned incidents.

11. On 20 October, an intoxicated local police officer threatened a Mission observer with a pistol at the Krstac border crossing point in Sector Charlie. A police patrol was immediately dispatched from police headquarters in Niksic to the border crossing point, where the intoxicated police officer was arrested. The Chief of the Niksic police station personally expressed his apology to the Mission Head of Sector and stated that it was an exceptional case which should not erode the existing friendly relationship between Mission personnel and the local police in the area.

12. On 21 October, one Mission mobile patrol from Sector Charlie was detained for three hours by members of VJ military at the checkpoint in Kovaci before the observers were released. The local authorities apologized, saying it was a "misunderstanding".

V. COOPERATION OF THE AUTHORITIES OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO) WITH THE MISSION

13. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned incidents, cooperation with the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to be generally good. However, despite repeated requests, the Mission has experienced serious delays in receiving the Government's approval for licences to extend the Mission's radio communications network.

VI. INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM NATIONAL AND OTHER SOURCES

14. The operating principle of the Mission is to base its reporting and evaluations on its own observations and on information that it has verified. The Mission Coordinator maintained a standing request to Governments possessing the technical capacity to provide the Mission with information relevant to its mandate.

15. At the end of September and in early October, the Mission Coordinator, on several occasions, received information from unidentified sources of possible attempts to violate the border closure. Immediately, the Mission took various steps to detect and prevent transgressions of United Nations resolutions pertaining to the border closure. These putative operations and the preparation of the Mission's monthly report were occurring simultaneously and therefore were not mentioned in the previous report (S/1995/865). Furthermore, because of the precision of the information received, no details can be provided in the present report for fear of compromising the sources. It is noteworthy that the precision and timeliness of some information have enabled the Mission teams to increase their vigilance and apparently avert possible violations in eight different instances.

16. At the end of October, the Mission received information of a possible attempt to smuggle goods from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into Bosnia and Herzegovina in two tractor-trailers. These vehicles did not appear at the border.

VII. PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED AND REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO THE AUTHORITIES

17. Unarmed uniformed personnel continue to cross the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the reporting period, 348 unarmed uniformed personnel crossed the border at Sremska Raca (Sector Belgrade), four at Badovinci (Sector Alpha) and 10 at Trbusnica (Sector Alpha). On 30 October, a Bosnian Serb policeman in uniform carrying a sidearm was allowed to cross the border into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at Brbanj (Sector Charlie). He visited the local coffee-shop and returned into Bosnia and Herzegovina a few minutes later.

18. In response to a request by the Director-General of the Yugoslav Federal Customs Administration, Mihalj Kertes, the Mission Coordinator, on 13 October, approved as humanitarian aid the crossing of four tankers transporting 50 tons of heating oil, 30 tons of diesel and 30 tons of petrol. Mr. Kertes had stated that the consignment was destined for the bakery and hospital at Banja Luka to cope with the deteriorating refugee situation caused by the influx of refugees in the area. On 19 October, Federal Customs Officers at Sremska Raca (Sector Belgrade) allowed a similar consignment of four tankers to cross the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina. This time, Mission headquarters was not consulted and the act was considered a clear violation of the border closure and called for an explanation from the responsible authorities.

19. On 20 and 21 October, the Mission Coordinator raised the matter with Director-General Kertes and his Deputy, Mr. Bran Knezic. They claimed that letting the consignment cross on 19 October was based on a "misunderstanding" between the Mission and the Customs authorities. On 24 October, the Mission Coordinator called on Director-General Kertes. In the course of the discussions, Mr. Kertes explained that an agreement was reached within the Government of the Republic of Serbia to send, on a monthly basis, large quantities of oil products as humanitarian aid to the "Republika Srpska". In the context of the ongoing peace negotiations, the matter required the immediate attention of the Co-Chairmen. On 27 October, Mr. Stoltenberg brought the matter to the attention of President Milosevic.

20. On 2 November, the Mission Coordinator and his Senior Customs Adviser called on the Deputy Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Mr. Nikola Sainovic, at the latter's request and upon instructions of President Milosevic. Mr. Sainovic explained that there was no intention to breach United Nations regulations nor to circumvent the Mission's mandate. He stressed that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) would maintain full and strict adherence to the border closure agreement. Oil products would not be allowed to cross the border as humanitarian aid to the "Republika Srpska".

21. During October, an increased number of "humanitarian aid" consignments was denied. For example, in the first two weeks of October there was an average of six refusals per day. The most common cases were Bulgarian sugar, Romanian salt, Italian washing powder and bulk corn, which were found to be trade consignments and not humanitarian aid. Therefore, the Mission teams refused to place seals on the trucks. A list of suspected traders has been established to prevent commercial companies engaged in trading with the "Republika Srpska" from supplying consignments in the future.

22. The increased number of mobile patrols, especially along the River Drina, has enabled the observers to detect the following incidents:

(a) On 10 October, a patrol observed smugglers loading fuel cans on a boat near Mali Zvornik. A VJ military patrol moved into the area and the smugglers managed to escape with eight 100-litre barrels in a 4-metre wooden boat, but left behind three full 100-litre barrels and one 50-litre can. On 12 October, in the area 5 kilometres south-east of Citluk, the same Mission patrol saw smugglers transporting approximately 10 crates of beer across the Drina River into Bosnia and Herzegovina;

(b) On 16 October, another patrol sighted a large boat crossing the Drina River carrying six men and more than 50 heavily loaded cardboard boxes. A large truck awaited the boat on the Bosnian side. On 18 October, a Sector Alpha mobile patrol observed five smugglers unloading boxes from a large boat onto a large truck on the Bosnian side of the Drina River;

(c) On 23 October, observers sighted a large boat fitted with an outboard motor on the Bosnian side of the Drina River. When the patrol approached to observe the activity, the perpetrators disappeared into the bushes leaving their boat and a large number of beer crates and cardboard boxes.

23. On 3 November, an observer saw a man with an ox-drawn wagon cross into Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 kilometres south of Kotroman (Sector Bajina Basta). The wagon carried four 200-litre drums, contents unknown.

24. On 13 October, a helicopter was observed crossing the border from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) into Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Nudo area (Sector Charlie). The authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) described it as a CASEVAC flight, stating that the United Nations was not informed because it was an emergency. The Mission has no means of verifying this information provided by the Federal authorities. During his meeting with the Director-General of Federal Customs on 24 October, the Mission Coordinator underlined the seriousness the United Nations Security Council attaches to any unauthorized helicopter flights crossing the border. On 28 October, one Mi-8 helicopter, originating from the Bosnian side and heading south-east, crossed the border south of the border crossing point at Scepan Polje (Sector Charlie). The Federal authorities have yet to explain the nature of this flight.

VIII. CERTIFICATION

25. In the light of the foregoing developments, based on the Mission's on-site observation, on the advice of the Mission Coordinator, Mr. T. J. Nieminen, and in the absence of any contrary information from the air, either from the airborne reconnaissance system of NATO or national technical means, the Co-Chairmen conclude that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to meet its commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces. The Co-Chairmen also conclude that, during the period covered by the present report, there have been no commercial transshipments across the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/945
10 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 30 OCTOBER 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1011 (1995) of 16 August 1995, in which the Council requested me to report on my efforts for the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the Regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa.

In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council on 23 August (S/1995/735), I informed the Council that I had appointed Mr. José Luis Jésus as my Special Envoy for this purpose. My Special Envoy has now returned from the region, where he held high-level consultations with the Organization of African Unity and the Governments of Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania. He has reported to me that most of these Governments supported the idea of a regional conference.

The Government of Rwanda, on the other hand, expressed strong opposition to the idea of such a conference. The Government of Uganda also indicated that it was not keen to have the United Nations actively involved in this process.

Notwithstanding these reservations, the United Nations will continue to monitor developments in the region and I shall revert to the Security Council if it appears that conditions exist for the successful convening of a conference.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

95-34969 (E) 101195 111195

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/946
10 November 1995
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH AND FRENCH

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have considered your letter of 30 October 1995 (S/1995/945) pursuant to paragraph 5 of Council resolution 1011 (1995) of 16 August 1995. They wish to give every possible support to all efforts to reduce tension and restore stability in the Great Lakes region. They are grateful for your efforts and those of your Special Envoy, Mr. José Luis Jésus, to prepare for the Regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region of Central Africa. They note the views expressed by the Governments of States in the region. They encourage you to continue your contacts with the aim of convening the conference.

(Signed) Salim Bin Mohammed AL-KHUSSAIBY
President of the Security Council

95-34975 (E) 101195 131195

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/947
10 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the statement that I would have made had there been a debate on 9 November 1995 in the Security Council on agenda item "The situation in the former Yugoslavia" (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

95-35067 (E) 131195 141195

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Annex

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has throughout the crisis in the Balkans been gravely concerned over the serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law which have occurred in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia has provided within its territory shelter for more than 800,000 refugees, regardless of their nationality, who fled the war and persecution and breaches of human rights.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia deems that it is the obligation of the international community to put an end energetically to the genocidal actions of the Croatian authorities against the Serbs both in areas that were supposed to be protected by the United Nations and elsewhere throughout Croatia where the Serbs have remained following its forcible secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. According to many foreign observers and humanitarian organizations, the elimination of Serbs from Croatia and Krajina represents the most massive example of ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia, as more than 550,000 Serbs were expelled. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which consistently pursues a policy of national equality, has the unequivocal moral right to insist on the restoration and full protection of all of their legitimate rights.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia most strongly condemns any crime against people of any nationality, their freedoms or property and, regardless of who the culprits are, is firm in its stand that those responsible must be brought to justice and punished appropriately. All those who commit criminal acts against humanity in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are treated equally before the law regardless of their national background. Consequently, the Yugoslav authorities urged the leadership of the Republic of Srpska to undertake thorough investigations in connection with recent reports from Banja Luka and other areas and to bring to justice those who committed criminal acts against the Muslims and Croats.

As regards the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, its concrete activities have reinforced and not weakened the initial doubts about its impartiality. Out of 46 persons who have been indicted so far, 44 are of Serbian nationality. Does the Tribunal in this manner wish to demonstrate that the Serbs are 44 times more guilty than the two other sides in the civil war.

Despite the fact that it supports certain elements of the draft resolution presently before the Security Council on violation of human rights and humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of the opinion that it is counterproductive that the Security Council should be addressing this issue at this crucial time when finally key peace negotiations are being held at Dayton, Ohio, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive settlement to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. It would have been better for the Council to have given its support to the talks at Dayton than to focus on only one aspect of the crisis, thus giving ammunition to those parties that are trying to take advantage of certain events to further their own political

agenda, increase the pressure on the Bosnian Serbs and the Yugoslav side and to postpone the attainment of a peaceful settlement.

At this decisive moment, which is to determine whether peace will finally come to the Balkans or the war option will prevail, it is essential that the Council give full support to the peace process and not be sidetracked by obvious attempts by some parties to bolster their negotiating position and increase the pressure on their adversaries.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/948
13 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At its 3593rd meeting, held on 13 November 1995, the Security Council considered its draft report to the General Assembly covering the period from 16 June 1994 to 15 June 1995. The Security Council adopted the draft report without a vote.

95-35157 (E) 131195 141195

UNITED NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/751
S/1995/949
13 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda items 28 and 104
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
RIGHT OF PEOPLES TO SELF-DETERMINATION

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 10 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the annex to the letter dated 31 October 1995 and signed by Mr. Vladislav Jovanović concerning the "activities of mercenaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina" (A/50/708-S/1995/908), and to bring to your attention the allegations contained in paragraph 4 of the annex that "the intelligence services of some other countries, such as ... Slovenia also participate in the recruitment of mujaheddin and their transfer to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina" and that "training centres have been set up in Slovenia", etc.

I wish to inform you that these allegations are absolutely baseless.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 28 and 104, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
Ambassador

95-35312 (E) 141195 141195

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/748
S/1995/950
14 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 54
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 13 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to forward herewith a letter dated 12 November 1995 from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic State of Afghanistan addressed to you.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 54, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ravân FARHÂDI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

ANNEX

Letter dated 12 November 1995 from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan addressed to the Secretary-General

Pursuant to the previous letter, dated 12 October 1995 (S/1995/88), addressed to you in connection with the tension created by the interference of the Pakistani Government in Afghanistan, the following is brought to your attention:

The bands of Taliban, under the direct control of the Pakistani Government, recently gathered at the outskirts of the capital Kabul and suffered repeated setbacks as a result of the crushing blows by the forces of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, thus falling short of their heinous plans of taking over the city of Kabul.

Contrary to the claims made by the Pakistani Cabinet Ministers, proclaiming the Taliban bands to be an army of peace, this group has lately indiscriminately intensified its rocket attacks on the residential and non-military areas of Kabul. This is an attempt at the mass killing of the helpless citizens of Kabul.

On 11 November 1995, the Taliban launched as many as 170 rockets on the civilian-populated sectors of Kabul, as a result of which 37 innocent lives were lost and more than 52 civilians wounded, while immense damage was inflicted upon public property.

It gives me great anguish to note that most of the victims of these brutal rocket attacks were defenceless women and children engaged in normal daily activities. Among the martyrs were a group of six professional film-makers engaged in production of a film, as well as five schoolgirls who lost their lives while taking their college entrance examination at a testing centre.

The leadership of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, wishing to stress its position of principle in favour of the transfer of power and its support to the efforts of Ambassador Mestiri, Head of the Special United Nations Mission, is of the conviction that the interference of the Pakistani Government in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, characterized by its backing of Taliban and the recent added rocket attacks on the innocent inhabitants of Kabul, are aimed at subverting and impairing the very sensitive inter-Afghan dialogues.

To ensure a positive and smooth peace process in Afghanistan, the Islamic State of Afghanistan requests you to press the Pakistani Government to put an end to this blatant meddling in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and stop the barbaric and inhumane rocket attacks upon the innocent people of Kabul and on public establishments.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Najibullâh LAFRÂIE
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/50/757
S/1995/951
15 November 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 92
THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES OF CROATIA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fiftieth year

Letter dated 15 November 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, and in addition to my letter dated 6 October 1995 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/843), I have the honour to enclose the text of the basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, signed between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the local Croatian Serb authorities in Eastern Slavonia on 12 November 1995 in Croatia.

I would kindly request your assistance in distributing this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 92, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative

95-35777 (E) 151195 161195

/...

Annex

Basic agreement on the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

The Parties agree as follows:

1. There will be a transitional period of 12 months which may be extended at most to another period of the same duration if so requested by one of the parties.

2. The United Nations Security Council is requested to establish a Transitional Administration, which shall govern the region during the transitional period in the interest of all persons resident in or returning to the region.

3. The United Nations Security Council is requested to authorize an international force to deploy during the transitional period to maintain peace and security in the region and otherwise to assist in implementation of this agreement. The region shall be demilitarized according to the schedule and procedures determined by the international force. This demilitarization shall be completed not later than 30 days after deployment of the international force and shall include all military forces, weapons and police, except for the international force and for police operating under the supervision of, or with the consent of, the Transitional Administration.

4. The Transitional Administration shall ensure the possibility for the return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin. All persons who have left the region or who have come to the region with previous permanent residence in Croatia shall enjoy the same rights as all other residents of the region. The Transitional Administration shall also take the steps necessary to re-establish the normal functioning of all public services in the region without delay.

5. The Transitional Administration shall help to establish and train temporary police forces, to build professionalism among the police and confidence among all ethnic communities.

6. The highest levels of internationally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be respected in the region.

7. All persons have the right to return freely to their place of residence in the region and to live there in conditions of security. All persons who have left the region or who have come to the region with previous permanent residence in Croatia have the right to live in the region.

8. All persons shall have the right to have restored to them any property that was taken from them by unlawful acts or that they were forced to abandon and to just compensation for property that cannot be restored to them.

9. The right to recover property, to receive compensation for property that cannot be returned and to receive assistance in reconstruction of damaged property shall be equally available to all persons without regard to ethnicity.

10. Interested countries and organizations are requested to take appropriate steps to promote the accomplishment of the commitments in this agreement. After the expiration of the transition period and consistent with established practice, the international community shall monitor and report on respect for human rights in the region on a long-term basis.

11. In addition, interested countries and organizations are requested to establish a commission, which will be authorized to monitor the implementation of this agreement, particularly its human rights and civil rights provisions, to investigate all allegations of violations of this agreement, and to make appropriate recommendations.

12. Not later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period, elections for all local government bodies, including for municipalities, districts and counties, as well as the right of the Serbian community to appoint a joint council of municipalities, shall be organized by the Transitional Administration. International organizations and institutions (e.g. the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations) and interested States are requested to oversee the elections.

13. The Government of the Republic of Croatia shall cooperate fully with the Transitional Administration and the international force. During the transitional period the Croatian Government authorizes the presence of international monitors along the international border of the region in order to facilitate free movement of persons across existing border crossings.

14. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the adoption by the United Nations Security Council of a resolution responding affirmatively to the requests made in this agreement.

DONE this twelfth day of November 1995.

SIGNED:

Milan MILANOVIC
Head, Serb Negotiating Delegation

Hrvoje SARINIC
Head, Croatian Government Delegation

WITNESSED:

Peter W. GALBRAITH
United States Ambassador

Thorvald STOLTENBERG
United Nations Mediator

Thorvald STOLTENBERG
United Nations Mediator

Peter W. GALBRAITH
United States Ambassador